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A REVIEW OF A CASE AGAINST BLAISE
PASCAL AND HIS HEIRS
David A. Schum*
THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE. By L. Jonathan Cohen. New
York and London: Oxford University Press. 1977. Pp. 380.
$22.00.

I.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

A recent book by Professor L. Jonathan Cohen of Oxford
University, The Probable and the Provable, provides new insights into the concept of probability in the intellectual task of
inductive inference, a species of human reasoning about which
there is perpetual controversy. The terms inference and probability recur throughout jurisprudence. The fact finder in criminal or civil proceedings, for example, must often make inferences about the truth of facts when the evidence is incomplete,
inconclusive, or unreliable. This task, as Wigmore, for one,
concluded, 1 is usually inductive and can be viewed as using
observable evidence to draw conclusions about general propositions or facts. The fact finder, in other words, must weigh
evidence or balance probabilities. As Maguire et al. remark at
the very beginning of their casebook on evidence:
Evidence is produced at a trial so that an impartial trier can
decide how an event occurred. Time is irreversible, events
unique, and any reconstruction of the past [is] at best an approximation. As a result of this lack of certainty about what
happened, it is inescapable that the trier's conclusions be
based on probabilities. 2

Cohen offers a view of inductive inference which is rooted
in the works of Sir Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill. Cohen's
view of inductive inference leads to a new conception of probability, one, he believes, especially congenial to juridical inference.
In fact, he applies his new probability system, which he terms
inductive probability (PJ), to the Anglo-American legal system.
* Professor of Psychology and Mathematical Sciences, Rice University,
Ph.D. 1964, Ohio State University. Research suworted by National Science
Foundation Grant SOC 77-28471 to Rice University.-Ed.
1. J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 20 (3d ed. 1987).
2. J. MAGUmE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1 (6th ed.1973).
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Cohen contrasts his system with what he calls mathematical
probabilities (PM_). Mathematical probability was initiated by
the seventeenth-century French mathematician Blaise Pascal in
his studies of games of chance. Since Pascal's time many individuals have revised and extended mathematical probability systems which are highly useful in the study of a wide variety of
random processes. Although Cohen recognizes the richness of
mathematical probability systems and. their applicability to
many scientific areas, he notes their inadequacies for, and questions their applicability to, juridical inference.
Cohen frequently refers to PI measures as Baconian probabilities to acknowledge that they are part of the legacy of Bacon's seminal work on inferential methods of science. Similarly,
PM measures are frequently called Pascalian probabilities. As
the title of this review suggests, I will address Cohen's views
concerning the inadequacy of Pascalian PM measures and the
suitability of Baconfan PI measures in applications wi-tiiin
jurisprudence and related areas.
The Probable and the Provable assumes a fairly high level of
knowledge of formal logic and probability theory. However,
sections of this book which relate to inference in jurisprudence
can, I believe, be mastered by those who have some aversion to
or lack of interest in mathematics. In this review I offer two sets
of comments about Cohen's book, one for those averse to mathematical symbols and one for those without such an aversion. I
believe Cohen's work is important and will influence future
studies of juridical inference. Consequently, this book deserves
a hearing from the largest possible audience.

II.

NONTECHNICAL REVIEW

It is common to think of probabilities in connection with a
wide variety of phenomena in law, medicine, science, and business. Mathematics has developed a rich system of probabilities
useful in these areas. Although there has been some disagreement about what probabil-ity statements mean and about how
numbers called probabilities are determined, there has been
essential agreement among mathematicians about the basic
properties of probabilities. Probabilities are ~umbers between
zero and one. If there are two events that cannot both happen
at the same time, the probability of one or the other happening
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is the sum of their separate probabilities. If two events can both
occur, the probability of their joint occurrence is determined by
multiplying the probabilities of the separate events. In my introductory comments i' gave the label PM to probabilities which
have these three properties. These simple algebraic properties
have formed the basis of a rich and extensive probability system
which now helps solve many remarkably difficult and subtle
problems.
Rich food sometimes causes indigestion, and Cohen argues
that the richness of the PM system causes intellectual "indigestion" when mathematical probabilities are applied to inferences at trial. The symptoms of such indigestion appear in the
form of paradoxes: Some of these paradoxes arise because of
the multiplication rule within the PM system which determines
the probability of the }oint occurrence of two or more events,
while others arise because of a special case of the addition rule
which determines the probability that one of two events has
happened, if they both cannot have happened. This special
case is called the negation rule and concerns mutually exclusive
events like "rain tomorrow" and "no rain tomorrow" ·(which are
exhaustive, since it will either rain or not rain tomorrow) . The
event "no rain tomorrow" is the logical complement or the
negation of the event "rain tomorrow." If I tell you that the
probability of rain tomorrow is 0.8, I must, within the PM
system, tell you that no rain tomorrow has probability 0.2. The
more likely "rain" is, the less likely "no rain" is under the rules
of the PM system, since probabilities for complementary events
must total one.
Cohen argues that the multiplication rule for PM is inconsistent with the forensic standards of proof in civil cases and
with the many interpretations of the legal requirements for
"inference upon inference." In such inferences, you must, for
example, prove B from C and then prove A from B. Concerning
the "preponderance of evidence" or "balance of probability"
rule in civil cases, Cohen argues that the multiplication rule
within PM allows a plaintiff to lose his overall case on the balance of probability even if each element or component of the
case was won on the balance of probability. That is, the joint or
overall case consists of element 1 and element 2 and element 3
and so on. Under the PM system, the probability of the overall
case (given the evidence before the court) is obtained by multiplying the probabilities of each of the elements (given evi-

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

The Case Against Pascal

449

dence relevant to each element). Even assuming that the
probability of each element is much greater than 0.5 (to satisfy
the preponderance of evidence rule), the product of numbers
less than one sooner or later drops below 0.5. Thus, the overall
contention could have probability less than 0.5 even though
every element in the contention had probability greater than 0.5.
Moreover, when you multiply 0.8 times 0.4 you get the same
result as when you multiply 0.4 times 0.8; the order in which
multiplication is performed makes no difference. This causes
difficulties in relating PM to the frequent requirement that in
"inference upon inference" in civil cases where B is proved from
C and then A is proved from B, A can be proved from B "on
balance of probabilities" but B must be proved from C "beyond
a reasonable doubt." Thus, the A, B "link" in the chain of inference can be weak provided that the B, C "link" is very strong.
Because order of multiplication is irrelevant, the PM system
will give the same result if the A, Blink were strong and the B,
C link were weak.
Other difficulties arise, says Cohen, because the negation
rule requires that probabilities for complementary events must
equal one within the PM system. Cohen argues that this requirement makes a trialappear to be the division among the litigants
of a fixed amount of case weight; the more plaintiff receives the
less defendant receives. He believes this is unfortunate since the
str.ength of the plaintiff's arguments may not necessarily .detract from the strength of the defendant's arguments. In short,
he views a trial as a test of case strength and believes that the
PM system encourages the view that one litigant's gain is the
other's loss. Finally, Cohen tells us of other assorted difficulties
of applying PM to "prior presumption of innocence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt"- prescr1ptions in criminal cases and to
more specific problems concerning corroborative and convergent
evidence.
A major portion of The Probable and the Provable is devoted
to developing a new system of probabilities Cohen calls "inductive probabilities" and which I symbolize PI. Cohen's essential
claim is that his new system more adequately reflects the way
ordinary persons actually reason inductively. Inductive probabilities, although they rest upon developments no less carefully
reasoned than mathematical probabilities, have simpler, more
primitive, properties. In fact, they do not behave at all like PM
measures: they cannot be added, subtracted, multiplied, or di-
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vided. Although evidence can change the probability of an event,
we cannot say, for example, that event A is twice as likely as
event B, given relevant evidence. In fact, we can only make what
are called ordinal or ordering relations among inductive probabilities. I can say that, on the evidence, A is more probable than
B, but I can neither say how much more probable nor how many
times more probable.
The PJ system lacks the richness of PM. What do we receive
in return? Cohen argues that various prescriptions and standards in the Anglo-American legal system are not meant to satisfy mathematicians or philosophers; they are meant to guide the
reasoning of ordinary citizens when they serve as factfinders.
He further argues that the basic underpinnings of his PJ system
better reflect the ordinary inductive reasoning individuals use
in their day-to-day affairs. One of his claims is that the results
of psychological experiments involving probability estimations
are better explained in terms of the PJ system rather than the
PM system. In addition, he shows how the various paradoxes
mentioned above are not encountered in the PJ system. Unlike
the PM system, for example, the PJ system allows a plaintiff
to win a civil suit if and only if each element in the suit is established on the balance of probability. Moreover, in civil suits involving "inference upon inference," the Pr system is not insensitive to the ordering of strength among links in the inferential chain and in any litigation the Pr system captures the trial
as a test of strength rather than as a division of case merit.
If you read further, you will see that I do not agree with all
of Cohen's conclusions. The elegant simplicity of Pr, however,
illuminates a variety of evidentiary and other inferential issues about which there is unending controversy. I feel safe in
predicting that The Probable and the Provable will be an influential work in future studies of juridical and other inferences.

III.

TECHNICAL REVIEW

For those of you remaining with me I will now be a bit more
specific in telling you about what I believe are the important
aspects of Cohen's work.
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Mathematical Probabilities: A Legacy from Pascal

Let us begin by taking a brief look at certain developments
and interpretations of PM in order to identify those features of
PM that, according to Cohen, cause difficulties when it is
applied in various contexts, including juridical inference. In
games of chance the determination of probabilities is an exercise
in counting. In such games there is usually some "visible· symmetry" of the underlying process which reinforces the assumption of equally likely outcomes; fair dice, well-balanced roulette
wheels, and well-shuffled cards are examples of random processes which have this property of visible symmetry. Sometimes
the assumption of equally likely outcomes is called the indifference principle; if a die is fair you should be indifferent about
the likeliness of its six possible outcomes when the die is thrown.
In such cases the probability of event E is determined by counting the number of outcomes favorable to the occurrence of E
and dividing this number by the total number of outcomes possible. Probabilities so determined are sometimes called classical
probabilities; rules for their determination date from the time of
Pascal. Such determination is not possible when there is not a
finite number of possible outcomes or when there is no reason to
assume equally likely outcomes.
The so-called relative frequency interpretation of probability
extends PM to make it applicable to random processes in which
the outcomes are not necessarily equally probable and not necessarily finite in number. In such cases the probability of an event
is estimated empirically. Assuming a random process which is
repetitive or _replicable, the probability of an event E is estimated by determining the frequency of outcomes favoring this
event in a randomly chosen sample of n outcomes. The probability of E is estimated by the ratio of the number of outcomes favoring E to the total number n of outcomes in the sample. The
limit of this relative frequency in a long run of randomly
chosen samples is taken to represent the probability of E.
A relative-frequency interpretation of PM does rather well
as long as we wish to apply probability to processes which are
repetitive in nature. Many random processes in various areas of
science are repetitive in nature and so a relative frequency interpretation of probability is congenial to these areas. However,
we often wish to express our uncertainty about .the occurrence
of an event which either has happened or will happen exactly
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qnce. In many legal, medical, business, and military affairs it is
necessary to evaluate the likeliness of events in nonrepetitive
or nonfrequentistic processes; the events of concern are unique
or one of a kind. The probability that your horse wins tomorrow's race is a one-of-a-kind event since this race and its outcome
will happen exactly once. The event that defendant X was seen
running from the house where the crime was committed is a
unique event. Now, you will have no trouble in finding someone
who will express probabilities about various outcomes of tomorrow's race. Neither will you have difficulty finding a treatise on
evidence law which talks about probabilities in connection with
evidence that involves patently unique events ap.d nonrepetitive
outcomes. Under another interpretation of PM you a1:~ free,
subject to certain rules for coherency, to assign numbers called
subjective or personal probabilities which indicate the strength
of your belief that some repetitive or nonrepetitive event in
question has occurred or will occur. Adherents of this interpretation argue that your subjective probability of an event can be
supported by whatever information you have.
Other interpretations of PM are possible, including a causal
or propensity interpretation in which PM grades the measurable physical connection between objects or processes. Perhaps
the most complete summary of various interpretations of P:i\f
is to be found in a recent treatise by Fine.8 Cohen has performed
a valuable_ service by showing how various probability statements are, in fact, evaluations of inferential soundness and he
off~rs a useful categorization scheme for J?M based upon various
criteria for establishing inferential proof.
Following are seven properties of PM ; the first three are
basic or axiomatic. For each property we shall consider both unconditional or monadic probabilities of the form PM (E), where
E is some event of interest, and conditional or dyadic probabilities of the form PM: (EIF), which is read "probability of event E
given that or on the premise that event F occurred." By definition PM (EIF) = PM.(E n F) /PM (F), provided that PM
{F) =/= 0. The conjunction or intersection symbol n is read
"and." The terms monadic and dyadic are Cohen's terms; for
reasons discussed in his second chapter he objects to the term
"conditional probability."
8.

T. FINE, THEORIES OF PROBABILITY

(1973).
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For any event E, PM (E) ;:::: 0; for any events E and F
where PM (F) ~ 0, PM (EIF) ~ 0.
(ii) Let S be the "sure" event; one that is certain to occur.
Then, PM (S) = 1, and for any E where PM (E) '¥= 0,
PM(SIE) =1.
(iii) Suppose events E and F are mutually exclusive, then
PM (E U F) = PM (E) + PM (F). Assuming
PM (G) ~ O,PM (EU FIG) = PM (E!G) +
P.M (FIG). This is the so-called additivity property.
[The union or disjunction symbol U is read "or."]
(iv) Let Ecbe the complement of event E (i:e., E = "not
E"). Since E U Ec =Sand E and Ec are mutually
exclusive, PM (E)
PM (E ) = 1. Assuming
PM (F) =j= 0, PM (EIF) + PM (_ECIF) =1. This is·
the negation rule.
(v) For any two events E and F, PM (E n F) =
PM (E)· PM (FIE) where PM (E) # 0. If PM (G)
;;-= o, PM CE nFIG> = PM (EIG> · PM (FIE Ii G).
This is the conjunction or product rule.
(vi) Suppose event E fails to condition or change opinion
about the likeliness of F; i.e. PM (FIE) = PM (F) .·
In this case, events E and F are said to be independent
and PM (E n F) = PM (E) · PM (F). Suppose
PM (FIE n G) = PM (FIG) ; this asserts that events
E and F are independent conditional upon the occurrence of G. In this case the product rule for conditionally independent events is PM (En F!G)=PM (EIG)·
PM (FIG), provided PM (G) # 0.
(vii) Let H1 and H2 be mutually exclusive events where
PM (H1) =;6 0, PM (H2) ::;,= O. For any event E
where PM (E) ¥= 0, PM (E jiH2) = O, and
PM (H2 IE)=/= 0,
PM (H1IE)
PM (H1)
PM (EIH1) Th.
. th e
__
_;;c._=---X----.
ISIS
PM (H2IE)
PM (H2)
PM (EIH2)
"odds-likelihood ratio" form of Bayes' s rule, a derived
property of conditional or dyadic probabilities. The
left-hand term represents the posterior odds of H 1 to
H2 given E. The first term on the right is called the
prior odds of H 1 to H2 . The second term on the right
is called the likelihood ratio of event E.
(i)

+

Properties (iv) through (vii) represent a small sample from
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the very rich collection or syntax of properties derived from the
three basic axioms. As we shall see, Cohen argues that the negation and conjunction properties which are basic to PM give rise
to disturbing paradoxes when PM is applied in jurisprudence.
He further argues that these paradoxes are not evident under
his inductive interpretation of probabilities.
It is easily shown that classical and relative frequency interpretations of PM are consistent with the properties listed above.
In fact, the basic axioms of PM were motivated by the methods
used to determine classical probabilities. Are subjective or personal probabilities consistent with the axioms and other properties listed above? Of course it depends on whose. subjective probabilities we are discussing. Consider the event E that the
Yankees will repeat as World Champions in the 1979 season.
You have your view of the likeliness of this event and I have
mine. Subjectivists argue that, though we may reasonably disagree about PM (E), our probabilities ought to be coherent
within the three basic axioms mentioned above or else some unpleasant things can happen. If I say, for example, that PM (E)
= 0.2 and that PM (Ec) = 0.6 (in violation of the negation
property) I can-be exploited as a "money pump." This means
that certain wagers can be constructed in which I am guaranteed
to lose no matter what happens. Thus, subjectivists usually confine discussion to individuals who are "coherent" with the basic
axiom system of PM . Whether or not persons, left to their own
devices, are thus coherent is an interesting empirical issue, one
generating a substantial amount of research in experimental
psychology during the past two decades.
There are many methods for eliciting subjective probabilities
from individuals. Some involve indirect methods in which subjective probabilities are inferred from a person's choices among
wagers. Other methods are direct and involve overt elicitation of
probabilities, odds, and likelihood ratios. As you might expect,
coherency with PM axioms is sometimes observed and sometimes
not. Cohen argues that the actual responses of subjects in some
of the research in this area are coherent within P1 but not
within PM. In short, he argues that P1 is much better than PM
in describing the way in which people actually assess the likeliness of events in their everyday lives. He also tells us that it is
no accident that legal prescriptions regarding probability seem
to favor a P1 interpretation since these prescriptions have in
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mind the ordinary citizen who must apply his own reasoning
processes and accumulated experience in evaluating evidence.
I have one final point about PM and the properties listed
above. When one adds probabilities such as in Property (iii) or
takes ratios of probabilities such as in Property (vii) , there are
implicit assumptions about the scale properties of PM. In all
PM systems that I am aware of, PM (E) is a number in the
closed interval [0,1]. Adding probabilities assumes equal units
of probability and dividing probabilities assumes equal units
plus a true or nonarbitrary zero point. Though PM always
has a lower limit of zero in every system I am aware of, including Pi, there is plenty of room for argument about what zero
probability means, as the author discusses. It-is plausible to
think that PM is an equal interval scale for classical and relative .frequency versions of PM, but what about ·subjective versions?"Is the change in your subjective likeliness of from 0.67 to
0.68 equivalent to the change of from 0.43 to 0.44? This is a
serious issue for me since most of my rebuttal arguments
against some of Cohen's conclusions involve .subjective judgments of ratios. I will return to this issue in a later section of
this paper.
B.

Inductive Probabilities: A Legacy from Bacon and Mill

At the basis of Cohen's system of inductive probability is his
belief that probability is a measur·e of inferential soundness or
provability. Because there are different kinds of proof rules,
there are different kinds of probability. Thus, if we say that the
probability of E on the premise F indicates the degree of inferential soundness of a rule for inferring E from F we shall have
to accept di.fferent interpretations of this probability since there
are various ways in which such proof can be established. I have
already mentioned the author's categorization of PM measures
based upon various proof criteria. Thus, the author emphasizes
from the very outset of his work that his system of PI measures
is not intended to replace other conceptions of probability. What
he does argue is that there is a particular proof criterion which,
if considered, leads one to a new system for grading the inferential soundness of inferring E from F and, thus, grading the
probability of E given knowledge that F occurred. This new
system of inductive probabilities does not conform to the calculus
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of PM. Though there are a few points of contact between Pi and
PM, PI is not derivable from PM nor is it in any sense a special
case of PM,
A brief comment about notation is necessary before I proceed. In discussing PM I have used notation that is common in
many treatises in which PM measures occur. The monadic or
unconditional probability of E was indicated by PM (E); the
conditional or dyadic probability of E on premise F was indicated by PM {EIF). ~hen I discuss Cohen's p·I measures I will
use his notation scheme to help prevent the reader from being
confused about which system is being discussed. In the P1 system, the monadic probability of E is represented by P1 {E) and
the dyadic probability of E on the premise F is represented by
PI {E,F).
A neglected criterion of proof, according to Cohen, concerns
a property he calls "completeness." A deductive system is said
to be complete if statement E is provable from the axioms of the
system if and only if Ec is ·not provable. Applied to PM we can
consider the provability o:fi E from Fas a limiting case of PM
where PM {EIF) · ~ t. T~e PM system is consistent with this
property of compl~teness since, by the negation rule, PM (EIF)
= 1 if and only if PM (Ec IF) =0; that is, E is provable from F
if and only if Ec is not provable from F.
In an incomplete deductive system there is at least one wellformed statement E such that neither E nor Ec is provable. In
such a system we allow for cases in which both the probability
of E on premise F and the probability of Ec on premise F are
zero. This obviously rules out PM as a measure of provability in
an incomplete system since PM (EIF) = 0 and PM (ECIF) = 0
is incoherent with the PM axioms. One question is: Why should
we have to consider an incomplete system? Suppose, as the autho:L" argues, we construe the "weight" of relevant evidence to
mean the amount of relevant evidence as Keynes4 and others
have done. Keynes proposed that argument E has more weight
than argument Ec if E is based upon a greater amount of relevant evidence; i.e., E has greater probability than Ec if the
evidence on balance favors E. The gradation of provability or
the probability of E, given evidence F, depends just on the
amount of evidence. Within the PI system, if the amount of
4. J. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 71-78 (1921).
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evidence F on balance favors E, P1 (E,F) > 0. If F provides an
increment of inferability to E it provides none to Ec and so Pr
(Ec,F) = 0. From the point of view that weight of evidence
means amount of evidence, F cannot support E and Ee at the
same time. Here we have a crucial distinction between PM and
Pr. In the P1 system if·Pr (E,F) > 0 then P1(Ec,F) = 0; the
negation principle for Pr is not complementary as it is in
PM . In fact, -in a PM system, as PM (EI F) increases,
PM (EC IF) decreases since PM (EjF) + PM (EC jF) = 1.
We must also notice that the converse of the Pr statement "if
Pr (E,F) > 0 then P1 (Ec,F) = 0" is not true. Evidence F may
be completely indecisive or irrelevant on E and on Ec and so both
PM (E,F) and PM (Ec,F) may be zero. Thus if we say that Ec
is not pr9vable from F we cannot necessarily say that E is
provable from F since it may be the case that neither E nor Ec
is provable from F. The author further argues that in many
everyday matters we must reason inductively from incomplete
evidence and what we need is a measure of how extensive is the
completeness or coverage of relevant issues by the evidence we
have.
As we shall see, the Pr measure has scale properties that
differ from those of PM. In fact P1 has only rank-ordering or
ordinal properties. In this system we can only say that Pr (Ei,
F1) is greater than, less than, or equal to Pr ( E2,F2) : We
cannot say how much greater or how many times greater is Pr
(E1,F1) than PI (E2,F2). This rules out any kind· of additivity
and it rules out the formation of ratios of probability measures.
As we observed, the additivity of PM requires an equal unit, and,
ratios of PM require equal units and a true or nonarbitrary
zero point. Thus, as far as scale properties are concerned, PI
is a more primitive measurement system than is PM. As we
have seen, Pr has neither of the two main properties of PM ;
Pr is neither additive nor complementational. Professor Cohen
does not view with alarm the fact that Pr measures are more
primitive than PM measures. In fact he believes that the ordinal characteristics of Pr better account for human inferential
behavior and for the manner in which various legal prescriptions
are written.
The next questions to be asked are (a) How does one determine the gradation of provability or inductive support offered by evidence F to proposition E? and (b) How does this
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gradation of support influence the probability of E on the premise F? The author devotes six chapters (chapters 12-17) to
these matters. The foundation of PJ rests upon certain developments within inductive logic concerning the concept of inductive
support. Let us first see how PJ forms part of the intellectual
legacy from Bacon and Mill. It was Sir Francis Bacon who, in
his treatise Novum Organum (1620), first attempted to formulate and justify inductive procedures for natural science. 0 He
argued that a proposition or generalization could not be validated simply by enumerating evidential instances favoring the
proposition but it could be invalidated by a single unfavorable
instance. He thus proposed a method of induction by elimination.
Some hypothesized cause must be co-present, co-absent, or covariant to some degree with corresponding effects. Inductive
inference, according to Bacon, proceeds by using presence, absence, or degrees of covariation of effects in order to eliminate
various hypotheses about causes until perhaps only one hypothesized cause is left; the one that survives this process of elimination can be accepted as the valid cause. This procedure, of course,
reminds one of a canon for reasoning much favored by another
sage, Sherlock Holmes, who is reported to have said:
It is one of the elementary principles of practical reasoning
that when the impossible has been eliminated the residuum,
however improbable, must contain the truth. 0

John Stuart Mill proposed a collection of specific methods
for induction in his treatise System of Logic. Most presentday students of experimental design in various areas of
behavioral, biological, and physical sciences study extensions
of Mill's, methods without being aware of it. Mill is frequently
not given appropriate credit for systematizing the design of
empirical research. A variety of procedures exist for introducing various experimental "controls" so that one can
isolate valid causes by removing the confounding effects of
other possible alternative causes. Cohen tells us that the process
of grading inductive support that one proposition can give
another has a close affinity to three of Mill's methods for induction. The method of agreement establishes the co-presence of
a cause and effect; the method of difference establishes the coabsence of a cause and effect; and the method of concomitant
5. W. KNEALE, PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION 48 (1949).
6. A. DOYLE, THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK HOLMES 17 (W. Baring-Gould ed.
1967).

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

The Case Against Pascal

459

variation establishes the covariation of a cause and effect.
Suppose a situation in which we entertain a particular hypothesis H j which explains a characteristic of some phenomenon
of interest; how do we obtain inductive support for H j? There
may, of course, be other plausible hypotheses or explanations.
Imagine now a series of tests which can discriminate among
alternative hypotheses. Each test involv~s some relevant variable which can be manipulated independently of all others. The
complexity of the test sequence increases as we proceed because
at each stage a new relevant variable is added to those already
present. As the test sequence proceeds.some hypotheses are falsified by test results and are eliminated from consideration. Suppose Hj survives the process of elimination. The degree or grade
of support given by the test sequence to H j depends upon the
complexity level of the test that H j attains. At some point we
run out of relevant variables to manipulate or we run out of
time or money and so we stop testing; the surviving hypothesis
or hypotheses win the day in this process of eliminative induction. Mill's methods for induction provide the essential logic for
the design of the test sequence.
Formally, Cohen identifies a support function, s (H, E), which
is read "The support for H, given test result E." Suppose there
are n test levels 1, 2, 3, ... , i, ... , n which represent increasingly complex tests. If H resists falsification or elimination up to
test level i we can say that the grade of inductive support for H,
given test result E, is s (H, E) = i/n. Test result E gives the ith
grade of support where n is the highest grade possible. The support function value s (H, E) = i/n says that H has support up to
level i and no higher; i.e., H was falsified at level i + 1. Suppose the test sequence is replicable; if you object to the test result the person performing the test sequence says "do it yourself." Suppose you do and achieve the same result. Replicability,
in short, provides a measure of confidence in the test result. A
test sequence replicated enough times becomes, as the author
says, a "solid evidential fact." Thus, if s (H, E) ~ i/n on the
basis of replicable or "solid" evidence we are entitled to conclude
that s(H) ~ i/n; i.e., we can talk about the support for H
without having to qualify it with a particular test result. Suppose s(Hj,E) = O; Hj is falsified by the simplest test. Hypothesis H k, however, passes test i but is falsified by test i + 1;
s (H k, E) remains at level i/n and does not drop to zero because
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H k obviously has more support than Hj which had none at all.
It is always possible, and the author cites examples of when
it has happened, that a theory or proposition H may be true but
fail to explain certain effects. Anomalies do occur and any
theory of induction must be able to handle them. It would seem
foolish to suppose that no theory could remain acceptable when
confronted with counterevidence. Perhaps, with some slight modification, theory H can be rescued and resist being falsified at
some level; one can buy support for H by revising it.
So far we have an inductive support function s (H, E) which
maps ordered pairs of propositions H, E into n + 1 fractions
from Oto n/n, wheres (H; E) = 0 means that His falsified by
the simplest possible test ands (H, E) = n/n means that His
not falsified or eliminated throughout the entire test sequence
and has the highest level of support. The value of n may not be
specifiable in any practical application. Technically, this presents no problem since it is apparent that the support function
assigns values with only ordinal properties since there is no
apparent equal unit of "test level difficulty" specifiable. Thus
s(H, E) only ranks evidential support; the numbers thus obtained are not additive nor can they be used to form ratios.
The support function s(H, E) has a number of properties,
two of which are of special interest in view of the author's concerns about PM measures.
(i) Negation. For any Hand E, where E concerns a physically possible event or conjunction of events, if s (H, E) >
0/n thens (He, E) = 0.

This property may seem inconsistent with what was said earlier
about the support given H when there is counterevidence at level
i + 1; i.e., s(H, E) stays at level i/n and does not drop to zero.
The negation rule asserts that E cannot favor H and Hc at the
same time; if it favors H then s(Hc, E) = 0. Observe that H
and He are contradictory statements; if a test sequence which E
reports appears to favor both sides of a contradiction the test
sequence itself must be inconsistent and requires adjustment.
(ii) Conjunction. Suppose H1 and H2 are two propositions and E is some report of a physically possible test sequence. If s(H1, E) ;;;:: s (H2, E), then s(H1 n H2, E) =
s (H2, E).

The conjunction principle asserts that the support given by E
to the joint statement Hi n H2is the same as that given to the
less-well-supported of the two propositions or to their common
support level if they are equal.
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The remaining question concerns how inductive support and
inductive probability are related. The author tells us that Pr
(R, E) stands in relation to s(R, E) as deducibility stands in
relation to logical truth. The inductive probability that a particular thing is R, on the premise that it is ~, is equivalent to the
inductive support for the generalization that anything if it is R
is also E. The corresponding symbolic assertion is that Pr (Raj,
Eaj) = i/n if and only if s (Raj Eaj) = i/n. The symbols
like Haj are read "particular aj is an R"; the arrow means
"logically implies." The more support you have for a generalization involving Hand Ethe higher is-the-probability of R given
a particular instance of E. The author cautions us that the evidential processes leading to an assessment of P1 (R, E) _are not
necessarily the same as those leading to s CH, E) . The establishment of s(H, E) rests upon suitably varied experimental or
observational conditions which are replicable. The establishment
of P1 (R, E), however, rests upon satisfying ourselves that E
favors or supports H iJ1 the particular circumstances which E
and R describe.
Inductive probabilities have a number of basic and derived
properties which are summarized in a syntax in chapter 17.
Following are properties of special interest.
For Monadic Probabilities:
(i) P1 (R) ~ 0.

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

If PJ (R)

> 0, then PJ (He)

If PJ (H1 ) ~ PJ (H2), then
PJ (H1 n H2) = PJ (H2 )._
PJ (H1 U H2)

~

PJ (H1 ).

= 0.

(Negation)
(Conjunction)
(Disjunction)

P1(H1) ~P1(H2) orP1(H1) ~P1(H2)·
If Pr (H1) ~ PJ (H2), and PJ (H2) ~ PJ (H3 ),

then PJ (HJ)~ Pr (H3 ).
For Dyadic P1·obabilities :
(i) Pr (H, E) = PJ (He, EC).

( Contraposition)

(ii)

If Pr(H, E) > 0 and PJ (Ee)= O, then
PJ (Hf E) = 0.
(Negation)

(iii)

If Pr (H1, E) ~ Pr(H2, E), then P1(H1n H2, E)

= PJ (H2, E).

(Conjunction)
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(Disjunction)
(v)

(vi)

Pr(H1,E1) ~Pr(H2,E2) orPr(H2,E2)
~ Pr (H 1' E1 ) .
If Pr (H1, E1 ~ Pr (H2, E2) and Pr (H2, E2)
~ Pr (H3, E3), then Pr(H1, E1) ~ Pr(H3, E3 ).

Like PM , P1 has far too many derived properties to be
easily summarized. Following are some facts about P1 which
are important in relating P1 to inferential issues in jurisprudence and other related areas.
(1) According to Cohen the monadic or prior inductive
probability Pr (H) tells us something about the strength of
nature's potential for bringing H about and it has a completely
different interpretation from PM (H). The essential point is
that Pr (H) = 0 means simply that there are no prior reasons
for believing H and not that there are prior reasons for believing HC. For PM, however, PM (H) = 0 if and only if
PM (HC ) = 1 which indicates, according to the author, that
there are prior reasons for believing HC . The monadic negation
principle asserts that if Pr (H) > 0, ·then Pr (HC) = 0. For
Pr, if the weight (amount) of your prior reasons supports Hit
cannot, at the same time, support HC.
(2) Properties (iii) and (iv) for monadic and dyadic inductive probabilities concern conjunction (intersection) and disjunction (inclusive union). These properties for P1 may be
compared with their counterparts in PM by considering the
following inequalities. For monadic probabilit1es, where H 1 and
H2 are any two events: PM CH1 n H2) ·:s:;; PM (H{)
:s:;; PM (H1 U H2) ~ PM (Hi) ·+·PM lH2·)~Jior dyacfic
probabilities, where H1, H2, and .E are any three events with
P(E) ~ 0: PJY.I (H1 n H2 IE) :s:;; FM (H1 IE) ~ PM
(H1 U H2 IE) :s:;; PM (H1 IE) + PM (H2 IE).
( 3) The reader familiar with measurement theory will have
observed that properties (v) and (vi) for both monadic and dyadic Pr concern weak-ordering. These properties are similar to
the connectedness and transitivity axioms of subjective value
theory. 7 Subjective value is an ordinal measure of the worth or
value of an outcome in a decision task.
(4) Property (i) for dyadic Pr is interesting. It says that
7. R. KEENEY & H. RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES: PREFER•
ENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS (1976).
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dyadic PI is invariant under contraposition of its arguments
(Hand E). This is not a ch~i-_a~teristic of PM since PM (HIE)
need not egEaJ_RM (~CJ.EC ) . _
·
(5) One of the most interesting and surprising properties of
PI is the mann~r in which the inductive probability of H changes
in response to favorable and unfavorable evidence. Consider
H and He , supposing a priori that the weight of our prior reasons for believing H is no heavier than the weight of those favoring He. Then, PI (H) = P1 (He)
Remember that,
within the PI system:''weight" means "amount." Now suppose
we have ~videnceE1· which supports H; then PI (H, E1)
equals, say, 1/~j_by the_ negatio~-principle P1 (He ,E) = 0.
Next, E2 is presented which is unfavorable to H. This makes P1
(He, E1 O E2) = 2/n while, surprisingly, PI (H, E1 n E2)
= O; again this is what we require by the negation rule. Evidence E 3 arrives which "counteracts" or explains away E2 and
H is resuscitated since PI (H, E1 ·n E2 n E3 ) = 3/n while
PI (He , E1 n E2 n E3 ) = 0 as· required. Thus there is a
marked asymmetry in the effect upon H that favorable and unfavorable evidence produce. Each item of uncounteracted favorable evidence increases the inductive probability of H one grade
higher. However, an uncounteracted piece of evidence immediately reduces the inductive probability of H to zero. If this seems
violently .counterintuitive to you, the reason perhaps is that you
are retaining PM in your head while reading about PI . Zero
probability in the PI system means something entirely different
than it does in the PM system. In the PM system PM (H) = 0
or PM (HIE) = 0 make H "legally dead" or beyond resuscitation even by evidence overwhelmingly supportive of H. Recall
that, within PM , PM (H) = 0 if and only if PM (HC) = 1, and
PM (HIE) = 0 if and only If PM (HC IE) = 1. A zero probability for Hin the P1 system simply indicates that an inference
to H cannot be made with any degree of support; it does not
mean that an inference to Hc can be made with complete support.

-·--o~

C.

The Case Against Pascal and His Heirs

If a formal or mathematical system is used to study how
some task ought to be performed it is said to be used normatively. Normative statements prescribe formally ideal behavior
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or behavior that is consistent with the basic axioms of the system. A formal system can also be used in efforts to study how
some task is actually performed; in such cases the system is
used descriptively. The author's essential claim is that significant difficulties arise when existing standards for forensic
proof as well as certain other evidentiary issues in the AngloAmerican legal system are construed in terms of the PM system. 8 Thus, his major arguments against PM concern how well
PM describes these actual standards and prescriptions in the
law as -it is written. He goes one step further by claiming that
PM is similarly deficient in describing human behavior in certain probability estimation tasks studied by experimental psychologists. He then proceeds to show why he believes that the P1
system better describes probabilistic aspects of our legal system
and better accounts for actual human behavior in some of the
experimental studies of probability estimation. Summarized below are six specific difficulties or paradoxes the author says we
encounter when existing legal prescriptions are construed in
terms of PM . He believes that these difficulties, though not
completely insurmountable for PM , are handled more easily
and naturally within PI .
1.

Conjunction Rule Difficulties in Civil Suits

Consider a civil suit in which plaintiff's contention H consists of a number of points or elements H1, H2, ... , Hn; i.e.,
H = (H1 n H2 n ... n Hn). Defendant's contention is Hc
= (H1 n H2 n ... n Hn )C = (Hf u H2c u .. u
Hn c). In a civil suit plaintiff must prove each element of his
case on the balance of or on the preponderance of probabilities.
Letting E represent relevant evidence in the case, this requirement asserts that, within the PM system, PM (Hi IE) > PM
(HiclE), for every Hi, Since PM (HilE) + PM (HiclE) =
1.0, PM (HilE) must be greater than 0.5. In addition, for the
overall contention to be proved on the balance of probabilities we
must have just a very few elements in the contention unless PM (Hi IE) is very large for all elements Hi, The reason
is that the conjunction rule for PM is multiplicative. If the Hi
n
are independent conditional on E, then PM (HIE) = i rr 1 PM
(Hi IE). If you multiply enough probabilities together (even
large ones), sooner or later their product is less than 0.5. This
same result will occur even if the Hi are conditionally noninde8. L. J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 58 (1977).
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pendent given E. Thus, a plaintiff in a complex civil suit involving many elements risks losing under a PM interpretation even
if he wins each element on the balance of probahllities. A constraint on complexity (number of elements in contention) is unknown in law and the author, therefore, concludes that the use of
PM 'is paradoxical in such cases.
The matter is resolved, says the author, when we construe
complex civil suits in terms of PI. Suppose Pr (Hk,E) is the
smallest value among the n values for plaintiff's case. By the
conjunction rule for PI :
P1 (H1 n H2 n ... n Hn, E) = P1 (Hk,E).
Suppose further that Pi (Hi,E) > Pr (Hi c, E) for every element Hi ; i.e., plaintiff wins every point of his contention. The
author says the jury can then infer that:

PI (H1 n H2 n ... n Rn, E) > Pr (H1C n H2c n ...
nHnc,E).
Now, the negation rule for PI asserts that, if Pr (H, E) > 0
and J;>r (EC) = 0, then Pr (He, E) = 0 and, therefore,
Pr (H, E) > Pr (HC, E). Thus, the inductive probability of
plaintiff's entire contention is guaranteed to exceed that of defendant's contention if plaintiff wins each point on the balance
of probabilities. Notice that there is no constraint on the num-:
ber of elements in plaintiff's contention.9
Suppose, however, that plaintiff loses just one of his points;
for element Hj, PI (Hf i E) > PJ _(!~), E). The conjunction
rule then will assert that, for plaintiff s case, Pr (H, E) =
Pr (Hj, E). A further property of Pr (not included in the summary above) 1s called the consequence property. It asserts in
this case that Pr (HC, E) ;;;::: ~I (Hjc, D). Thus, we have
Pr (HC·, E) ;;;::: PJ (Hjc, E) > Pr (Hj, E) = PJ (H, E). So
plaintiff loses his overall contention on the balance of pro~abilities. In summary, in the Pr interpretation of the case, plaintiff
wins the overall contention if and only if he proves all elements
on the balance of probability.
2.

Inference upon Inference

Considering civil cases again, the author believes PM to
9. Id. at 58-59.
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cause difficulties in cases involving "inference upon inference."
Wigmore, 10 referring to inference upon inference, believed that
what he called "catenations" of circumstantial and testimonial
evidence were common in most juridical inferences; for example, we seek to prove E from F and then prove H from E.
Recent work11 on the subject refers to this inference upon inference as "cascaded" or "multistage" inference. The author discusses how courts in civil cases normally require each level or
catenation, prior to the final level, to rest upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, in the above example we must prove E
from F beyond a reasonable doubt in order to prove H from F
on the balance of probabilities. In one possible formulation of
this problem in terms of PM the author shows how inferences
about H on the balance of probabilities could arise when
PM (EIF) is relatively small, surely not large enough in any
case to satisfy the reasonable doubt requirement. His claim is
that the multiplicative nature of the conjunction rule for PM
causes the difficulty. Because the operation of multiplication is
commutative, large PM (EIF) times small PM (HIEOF) yields
the same result as small PM (EIF) times large PM (HIE n F).
Such "transitivity" is not altogether expected; the author claims
that proof should depend upon what is probably inferable from
known facts rather than upon what is certainly inferable from
probable facts.
When we considered PM conjunction-rule difficulties involving component issues in civil cases, we saw how PM appeared quite severe in its effects upon proof on the balance of
probabilities. For inference upon inference in civil cases PM
now seems liberal when evalp.ated against existing legal standards. The author argues that in the PJ system, establishing E
on the premise F beyond a reasonable doubt establishes E as a
known fact which provides a firm foundation for establishing H
on the balance of probabilities. He further shows how the transitivity of proof mentioned above for PM does not occur when the
problem is construed in terms of PJ .

10. J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 13.
11. Schum, Current Developments in Research on Cascaded Inference Processes, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN DECISION AND.CHOICE BEHAVIOR (T. Wallsten
ed. 1979).

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

The Case Against Pascal
3.

Negation

Again consider a civil suit in which plaintiff's overall contention H survives on the balance of probabilities; suppose
PM (HIE) = 0.501 and PM (HCIE) = 0.499. Cohen argues that
the defendant in this case is entitled· to conclude that the legal
system has given itself a fairly wide margin for error. It has
recognized, in effect, that there is a substantial likeliness that a
losing case deserved to succeed; this, of course, is cold comfort
to the losing defendant in our example. The fact that the negation rule for PM is also complementational says that there is .a
determined amount of "case weight," and that this fixed amount
of weight is allocated to plaintiff and defend ant. The more one
side gets the less the other side gets. One may well question why
it should be true that increased support for plaintiff's contention
means decreased support for defendant's contention.
The author argues that this PM conception of balance of
probabilities in civil case determination is not what is intended
by our legal system. He says that civil litigation is a trial of
case strength rather than_ a division of case merit and he believes that the Pr system reflects this interpretation. We recall
that in the Pr system the negation rule is not complementational. In the case mentioned above, if we suppose that Pr (EC)
= 0, then Pr (H,E) > 0 implies that Pr (RC, E) = 0. Also recall
that in the PI system "weight" of evidence refers to amount of
evidence or the completeness of the coverage of relevant points.
If we say that the evidence on balance favors plaintiff,
PJ (H,· E) > 0. Since it cannot at the same time favor defendant, Pr (RC, E) = 0. Since plaintiff must win on every point
of a contention, Pr ( H, E) will increase as more relevant points
are considered provided that plaintiff's position is upheld on
each point.
·
4.

Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Now consider a criminal case in which H is the event that
defendant is guilty of the charge. Letting E represent the evidence before the court, how large should PM (HIE) be in order
to exceed the reasonable doubt standard? Suppose PM (HIE) is
less than 1.0 by some small amount. On evidence E you conclude
that H falls short of certainty by an acceptable amount and so.
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you conclude that H is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The author tells us that an interpretation of the reasonable
doubt standard in terms of PM is not appropriate. He argues
that reasonable doubt exists when there is at least one specific
reason for doubt and not simply that H falls short of certainty.
Within his P1 system what is necessary to satisfy the reasonable
doubt standard is a list of all relevant points that have to be
established (e.g., motive, means, opportunity, etc.) and satisfaction that the prosecution's case against defendant satisfies all of
these points. Maximal P1 ( H, E) is achieved on the basis of your
conception of the completeness of the coverage of evidence E on
relevant matters. Beyond a reasonable doubt is achieved if you
can think of no other specific reason for aoubting the defendant's
guilt.
5.

Criterion Difficulties

Since, as we saw earlier, there are different possible interpretations of PM , we have sooner or later to ask which one is
appropriate for application to juridical issues. The author rules
out classical probability for obvious reasons and rules out relative frequency for the reason that events in juridical matters are usually unique. Wager odds are ruled out for the
reason that such odds involve nonprobabilistic issues such
as the amount of money at stake. Finally, the author rules
out a conception of PM in terms of the "confirmation function,"
as proposed by Carnap,1 2 on the grounds that there is an infinity
of such functions and the choice among them is arbitrary. He
argues that advocates of PM must be able to supply a conception of PM that fills the gap. He tells us that P1 does supply a
conception of probability that is a natural representation of the
manner in which most of us reason inductively in our everyday
affairs. Since legal standards of proof and other prescriptions
are meant for jurors who, it is assumed, will apply their ordinary reasoning ability to evidence at trial, the author concludes
that PI is a better description of what is meant by probability
in existing legal standards and prescriptions.

12. R.

CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY

(1950).
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Difficulties Concerning Corroboration and Convergence

Corroborative testimonial evidence and converging circumstantial evidence· are frequently encountered evidentiary patterns in juridical and other inferences. Testimonial corroboration occurs when two or more witnesses testify to the occurrence
of the same event. Two or more items of circumstantial evidence
are said to converge if, independently, they favor the same conclusion. Under suitably articulated conditions a i'.!onjunction of
corroborative or a conjunction of convergent evidence raises the
probability of conclusion H by an amount greater than that
provided by any single item in the conjunction. The author presents several attempts to formalize these evidentiary patterns
within the PM system. He discusses an early attempt by Boole13
and a more recent attempt by Ekelof ;14 in addition the author
provides a formalization of his own using PM . The difficulty
with any PM analysis, according to the author, is that such
analyses 'require the incorporation of prior probabilities of conclusions. He objects to any representation for the probative force
of evidence which involves incorporation of prior probabilities of
conclusions. Among the difficulties he cites of incorporating
prior mathematical probabilities are:
(i) In civil cases if PM {H) is sufficiently strong, plaintiff
could establish an overall case on the balance of probabilities
even if one or more components of the contention are not established.
.
(ii) In the Anglo-American legal system, the accused is
judged only upon evidence before the court; the accused does
not come into court having a certain prior probability of guilt.
(iii) Within the PM system, if the prior presumption of
innocence is taken to mean very small prior probability of
guilt, how this probability is to be determined is unclear.

According to Cohen, when corroboration and convergence
are construed in terms of PI they simply become different ways
in which the inductive probability of conclusion H is increased by
circumstances which are inductively relevant. The added advantage, he says, is that the inductivist analysis requires no
13. ·Boole, On the Application of the Theory of Probabilities to the Question of the Combination of Testimonies or Judgments, 21 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH 597 (1857).
14. Ekelof, Free Evaluation of Evidence,

LAW 1964, at 45 (F. Schmidt ed.).

in 8 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
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assumption that the prior probability of any conclusion H be
greater than zero. We may have Pr (H) = 0; then, evidence E 1
is presented which favors Hand so Pr (H, E 1) > 0. If Pr (E1 C)
= 0, then Pr (HC, E1) = 0. Corroborative or convergent evidence E 2 is then provided for which Pr (H, E 2 ) > 0 ; this allows one to deduce that Pr (H, E1 il E2) > Pr (H, E 1). Suitable independence conditions involving E1 and E 2 can be articulated within the Pr system.
Two research topics of substantial current interest in experimental psychology concern subjective probability estimation and
the revision of such estimations in light of additional evidence.
A frequently employed research method is to present individuals
with the necessary probabilistic ingredients of some problem and
ask these persons to combine the ingredients in order to estimate
the probability of some event specified in the problem. Following
this, these subjective estimates are compared with corresponding
calculations based upon formally coherent combinations of the
problem ingredients. Of course, most of these calculations have
been based upon the calculus of PM. For example, individuals
may be supplied with a set of priors PM (Hi) and likelihoods
PM (EIHi) for i = 1, 2, ... , n and asked to estimate
PM (Hi ·IE) when Eis known to have occurred. Their estimates
are then compared with PM (Hi IE) calculated using Bayes's
rule.

No one ever expects estimates of probability to be exactly
equal to corresponding calculations based upon some formally
· coherent algorithm. Deviations occur, of course, but they are
usually systematic. For example, under some conditions posterior probability estimates made by experimental subjects are
typically more extreme than corresponding calculations prescribed by Bayes's rule. Under other conditions such estimates
are typically conservative with respect to calculations using
Bayes's rule. Another research method has involved inferring
an individual's subjective probability for certain events based
upon the person's stated preferences among alternative gambles
based upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the events. A not
unusual finding is that inferred subjective probabilities sometimes do not satisfy the complementation-negation rule for PM.
The author has taken results from a series of experiments
performed by Kahneman and Tverskyrn involving various prob15. Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHO•
LOGICAL REV. 237 (1973).
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ability estimation tasks. These researchers have, for a number of
years, been interested in determining heuristic rules which individuals appear to use in estimating probabilities. These heuristic rules individuals appear to use are inferred from comparisons between probability estimates and PM calculations. The
author strongly objects to the statement in some of these studies
that individuals are "incoherent" or are committing "fallacies"
when their estimates do not agree with those prescribed by PM.
He proceeds to show how some of Kahneman and Tversky's results seem to be explainable under the assumption that subjects
think according to Pr rather than according to PM. This, he
says, provides further argument in favor of his PI system when
applied to jurisprudence since legal prescriptions and standards
involving probability are written so that they will relate to common or ordinary conceptions of probability. Such conceptions,
the author believes, are inductive and not mathematical.
D.

Rebuttal Arguments in Defense of Pascal and His Heirs

Before I proceed with arguments in defense of PM applied
to inferences at trial I must now tell you that I am a defendant
in the case Cohen presents against PM in such applications; in
addition, I am not an attorJley. I am told that the name given
nonattorney defendants who plead their own cases is "guilty."
This acknowledged, I will begin by telling you of the surprise I
felt, upon reading the introduction of Cohen's work, to discover
the level of his discontent concerning PM applied in jurisprudence. The reason is that for the past few years I have been
studying what the PM system says are the necessary ingredients of various cascaded inference tasks. As I proceeded from
simple to more complex cases I discovered a substantial level of
agreement between the formalizations I was studying and corresponding prescriptions in the rules of evidence and in other
related treatises. I was further encouraged by discoveri:qg that
several evidence scholars having the background in law I .do
not have were arriving at similar conclusions about the efficacy
of the essential approach I was taking.
These remarks do not form a preface to a violent attack upon
Cohen's case against PM. In fact, I agree with many of the
concerns he exhibits about PM when applied to court trials.
Available juridical treatises contain an incredibly vast array of
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inferential issues, more than enough to occupy the attentions of
inference scholars over several lifetimes. It is obvious to me that
Cohen and I have focused our attentions upon different aspects
of juridical inference. We have examined different treatises or
different parts of the same treatise and each of us has found a
measure of support for his position. My belief is that no single
· formal system, including PM or PI , will form an adequate
representation of every juridical inference task or will account
for all of the assorted prescriptions made regarding inductive
inference in our Anglo-American legal system. Following is a
brief summary of the evidentiary issues I have examined which
increased my confidence in the descriptive power of PM applied
in jurisprudence and which led to my initial surprise upon :reading the early stages of Cohen's book.
Several years ago I became interested in what the PM system says are the necessary ingredients of the task of determining the inferential value of testimonial evidence from witnesses
whose credibility is less than perfect. 10 Our formalizations
showed, predictably, that the inferential value of such testimony
depends upon the probative value of the event being reported
and the credibility of the source. But these formalizations said
much more. They prescribed the exact nature of the interaction
between the rareness of an event and the credibility of the witness reporting this event in determining the prob·ative value of
the testimony from this witness. Such interaction was suspected
but not successfully represented in the formalizations of La
Place, Keynes, and others interested in juridical applications of
PM .17 Studying testimony from several witnesses, where such
testimony is either corroborative or contradictory, our resulting
formalizations show why the aggregate credibility rather than
the number of witnesses is important in determining the probative value of such evidence. 18 This corresponds with a legal pre-

16. Schum & Du Charme, Comments on tke Relationship Between tko Impact and tke Reliability of Evidence, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN
PERFORMANCE 111 (1971).
17. J. KEYNES, supra note 4; P. LA PLACE,
PROBABILITIES (Dover ed. 1951).

A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON

18. Schum & Kelly, A Problem in Cascaded Inference: Determining tho
Inferential Impact of Confirming and Conflicting Reports from Several Unreliable Sources, 10 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 404-28
(1978).
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cription mentioned by Cleary19 and by Wigmore. 20 We also discovered that our formalizations for the probative value of testimonial evidence included ingredients necessary for incorporating the major legal grounds for impeaching the credibility of a
witness and that our formal process was adequate in accounting
for what the rules of evidence say are the essential components
of hearsay evidence. 21
Another formal investigation concerned what has been
termed the process of "connecting up" the evidence or evaluating
a current item in light of previously given items. 22 Resulting
formalizations show that the process of evaluating a current
item of evidence against a background of prior evidence is akin
to color, brightness, and other contrast processes in sensory
perception. 23 In making a connection between inductive inference and sensory processes, we noted that it was Hume who said:
All probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation ...
when I give the preference to one set of arguments over
another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning
the superiority of their influence. 24
·

These formalizations for the process of connecting up evidence
also show conditions, such as those the courts recognize, under
which an item of evidence having no probative value on its own
is, nevertheless, deemed relevant because it conditions· opinion
about other evidence which is relevant. In very recent i.nvestigations we have examined various additional evidence subtleties
such as the locus and extent of redundancy in cumulative and
corroborative evidence, 25 and the joint role of bias-related and
observational sensitivity-related factors which determine the
credibility of a witness and, ultimately, the probative value of
19. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (2d ed.).
20. J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 318.
21. Schum, On the Behavioral Richness of Cascaded Inference Models:
Examples in Jurisprudence, in COGNITIVE THEORY 149 (N. Castellan ed.).
22. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 143-44
(1977).
23. Schum, Contrast Effects in Inference: On the Conditioning of Current
Evidence by Prior Evidence, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 217 (1977).
24. D. HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, Book I, Part III, Section VIII
(1881).
25. D. Schum, On Factors Which Influence the Redundancy of Cumulative
and Corroborative Evidence (Dept. of Psychology, Rice University, Report No.
79-02).
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what the witness reports. 26 In none of these investigations could
we discover corresponding juridical prescriptions to which our
formalizations seemed uncongenial.
As I read further in Cohen's book I was very impressed by
the elegant way in which he develops the essentials of his PI
system. I was also troubled by the paradoxes he mentions concerning application of PM in jurisprudence. I have no argument against the legitimacy of PI as an appropriate index of
uncertainty in inductive inference tasks. The author correctly
points out that some over-zealous mathematicists frequently refer to PM as "the" formal system of probability. PM is, in
fact, just one conceptual model for the articulation and manipulation of measures of uncertainty. Following are some general
concerns I have about the author's work as it is presented in The
Probable and the Provable.
1.

On the "Weight" of Evidence

My first concern has to do with the concept of relevancy and
the establishment of the probative weight of evidence. In chapter 10 on the topic of corroboration and convergence, the author
argues against any measure of the probative weight of an item
of evidence in terms of the difference between the posterior
probability of a conclusion, given this item, and the prior probability of the conclusion. However, Federal Rule of Evidence 401
defines relevant evidence as follows:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence. 27

This definition seems to specify a prior-posterior comparison of
the exact sort the author rejects. Within PM it seems natural
to construe the probative weight of evidence in terms of likelihood ratio, which is one appropriate and desirable measure of
the change from prior to posterior opinion about the likeliness of
a fact-in-issue. In discussing the properties of PM I listed
26. D. Schum, Sorting out the Effects of Witness Sensitivity and Response
Criterion Placement Upon the Inferential Value of Testimonial Evidence
(Dept. of Psychology, Rice University, Report No. 79-01).
27. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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Bayes's rule as Property (vii) . From this property it is easily
seen that the likelihood ratio for evidence Eis equivalent to the
ratio between posterior odds and prior odds of H to HC ; thus it
measures the change in your opinion about the relative likeliness
of H to Hc , giv.en E. I am not alone in this interpretation of
rule 401. Others'with the background in law I lack have reached
the same conclusion. 28
The prior probability of any His, of course, always relative
to the evidence you have. Let F = (E1 U E2 U ... U En}
represent the first n items of evidence you receive; then,
PM (HIF) represents your prior probability of H before you
receive the next item En+l . The likelihood ratio for En+l is
PM (En+1IH )
PM (En+l IHC)

n En+1)/PM(H IF}
PM (HCIF n En+l}
PM (HCIF};

PM(H IF

=

this measures the change in relative likeliness of H to HC from
prior to p~sterior upon knowledge of En+l. Since rule 401 says
nothing about how much evidence has been presented, it apparently recognizes that you will have some opinion about the
likeliness of H before any evidence is presented at trial. In this
case, let PM (H} represent your initial prior probability of H.
Then, PM (HIE1) represents the posterior probability of H
after the first item of evidence. If this were not the case, we
could never establish the relevancy of the first item of evidence,
thus, never get the trial started. Both the PM and P1 systems
have unconditional, prior, or monadic probabilities; that is, they
both acknowledge that your opinion about the likeliness of H has
to have some initial state if we can say it has been revised on
the basis of evidence. Neither PM or Pr assume that you begin
an inference task with a mental tabula rasa. The essential difference between PM and PI concerns how these and other
probabilities are interpreted and how they can be manipulated.
As mentioned earlier, the author says that Pr (H} represents
"nature's potential for bringing about H." Presumably then, Pr
(H, E} represents nature's potential for bringing about H, on
the premise that E occurred. The difficulty is that, since PI
measures are ordinal in nature, Pr (H} and P1(H, E} can never
28. Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Fact-Finding Process, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 1065 (1968) ; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977).
See also R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, supra note 22, at 148.
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be algebraically compared in attempts to measure the change
from prior to posterior likeliness of H as a result of E. However,
within the PI system, we can say that there is more evidence for
H or that there is greater evidential coverage for H now that you
know E. Thus it appears that prior-posterior comparisons are
natural within both PI and PM and both appear consistent with
rule 401. I will again discuss PM measures of probative value
when I consider the specific paradoxes the author has mentioned.
2.

Difficulties in Posing Inferential Problems

In discussing the paradoxes of PM and in making other
comparisons between PI and PM the author cites various PM
formalizations which he then proceeds to criticize in various
ways; in one or two cases he derives these PM formalizations
himself. In several cases, notably concerning examples of inference upon inference and corroborative and convergent evidence, I
believe the presented formalizations do not contain all necessary
probabilistic ingredients. Part of the problem is that the presented formalizations involving testimonial evidence require but
do not contain distinctions of the following sort. Let E = the
event that the traffic light at the scene of the accident was on
green, and let Ei = the event that witness W i testifies that the
traffic light at the scene of the accident was on green. The events
E and Erare not equivl;!lent events since, of course, we may have
Ej when Eis true or Ej when Ec is true. As a juror confronted
with testimonial evidence, your conclusion about H is conditioned
by Ej and not by E. A vague definition of a conditioning event
such as F = "the event that the witness testified correctly" can
contain no useful probative information since F does not tell us
to what event the testimony refers. Such information is crucial
in establishing the credibility-related ingredients of the formalization for the probative weight of testimonial evidence. In one
case involving corroborative and convergent evidence a formalization was cited which was formally incoherent within the PM
system. 29
In any formal system it is altogether crucial that problems
be posed adequately. In the case of inductive inference problems

29. L. J.

COHEN,

supra note 8, at 99-100.
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this involves careful determination of what constitutes the appropriate conditioning event (it is not always obvious) and it
involves articulation of appropriate conditional independence
considerations. None of the PM formalizations discussed by the
author involve likelihood ratios. Certain features of the P M
system are not evident unless formalizations involving probative weight are expressed in this fashion. In short, I believe the
PM system can be shown to much better advantage than it is in
Cohen's work.
3.

Subjective Probability: The Case of the Missing Criterion

In discussing various interpretations of PM at the beginning
of his book, the author mentions the subjective or personal interpretation of probability. Later, in discussing the "paradox" involving a choice of PM interpretation for juridical application,
he avoids mention of personal or subjective probability as one
possible choice. We recall that he does rule out classical, relative frequency, and confirmation-function interpretations. Since
the author does not mention the subjective interpretation, presumably he does not rule it out. On the other hand, he may
simply be treating the subjective interpretation with disdain.
After all, in his early discussion of the subjective interpretation
of probability he says that "few researchers in the natural or
social sciences have in fact adopted this personalistic approach."30
My view on these matters is somewhat different; within PM
I believe that the only extant interpretation which does merit
serious consideration in juridical inference is the personalistic
or subjective approach in which, subject to some coherence constraints, a subjective probability measures your strength of
belief in the occurrence of some event. Other individuals within
jurisprudence apparently share this view as well. Wigmore,31
for one, defines a measure of proof to be "the degree of strength
of belief of a fact-in-issue produced by evidence on the mind of
the jury." It is interesting to note that contemporary scholars
in probability theory define a subjective or personal probability

30. Id. at 27.
31. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,§ 2498a (3d ed.).
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in Wigmore's terms. DeFinetti32 defines a personal probability
to be "a measure of the degree of belief of a given subject in the
occurrence of an event." Cohen might be tempted to argue that
Wigmore's definition in fact corresponds to his conception of
probability as a degree of provability. This would be fine and,
if so, I would then see little difference between PI and the subjective interpretation of PM except in matters of scale properties. Finally, I cannot agree that the subjective interpretation of
probability appeals to few researchers in the natural and social
sciences. I find it hard to believe that the author is innocent of
the prevalence of the subjective interpretation of probability
in decision-theoretic areas of economics, business, medicine, and
psychology. In these and other areas many researchers would
prefer to use Bayesian statistical methods for analysis and interpretation of data but do not because they also wish to have
their papers accepted by journal editors who, all too frequently,
adhere to classical statistical approaches based upon a relativefrequency interpretation of probability and reject other approaches, not always for informed reasons.
Uncertainty about fact-in-issue H need not be expressed in
terms of probability. For example, posterior odds PM (HIE) /
PM (HC IE) expresses the likeliness of H relative to the likeli-.
ness orHc, on the premise that E occurred; likelihood ratio
PJv.l (EjH) / PM ~Ejlfc) ·expresses the likeliness of evidence E
under H relative to the likeliness of E under HC. The author
correctly rejects wager or betting odds as a representation for
PM in juridical applications since wager odds (such as those
supplied by your bookmaker) depend upon other factors such
as the size of the stakes involved and the number of wagers
placed. However, wager odds and either posterior or prior odds
are not the same. It is easily shown that they are mathematically
equivalent only for fair bets. Thus, posterior or prior odds can
be expressions of uncertainty and nothing else. Expressions of
uncertainty in odds and likelihood ratios have the advantage that
they are not bounded above as is the probability measure. I
quickly note, however, that this change of scale does not remove
the necessity for adherence to the PM axioms as far as the
ingredients of these ratios are concerned.
In much research on human inference behavior as well as in
a variety of applied tasks, individuals express relative uncer32. B. DEFINETTI, PROBABILITY, INDUCTION, AND STATISTICS 781 (1972).
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tainty in terms of odds and likelihood ratios. 33 There is an important issue here. The PI system credits individuals with being
able to make only weak order judgments regarding uncertainty
(i.e., "greater than," "less than," or "equal to" judgments).
The subjective interpretation of probability allows you to credit
individuals with being able to make ratio judgments of uncertainty. Is this confidence justified? As I mentioned earlier,
forming ratios on some scale assumes a zero point and a unit on
the scale; do subjective scales have such properties? We are here
confronted by one of the oldest and most perplexing problems in
all of psychology. Do the subjective continua of brightness, loudness, heaviness, or indeed likeliness, have equal units up and
down their scales? Perhaps no one will ever know; at least there
is no obvious methodology for making such a determination.
However, one thing clear is that individuals in a variety of
behavioral tasks make ratio judgments naturally and coherently; there are several methods for evaluating the internal coherency of such judgments.34 There is, in fact, good reason for
confidence in human ability to make ratio judgments. The necessity for preserving ratios of stimulus magnitude is readily apparent and is verified by an assortment of commonly observed
perceptual invariances.30 Unless our sensory-perceptual apparatus had finely tuned mechanisms for preserving ratio information, speech could only be understood at one level of volume and
a picture or a face would only be recognizable at one level of
illumination. If you are wondering what all this sensory-perceptual business has to do with probability and juridical inferences, perhaps you have forgotten Hume's argument (cited
above) in which he says that all probable reasoning is a species
of sensation. I, for one, have taken this analogy very seriously
in efforts to understand complex inference.36
In both the PM and Pi systems probability is viewed as a
quantitative rather than a qualitative property. One difference
between the two systems is that PI assumes ordinal judgments
only whereas subjective interpretations of PM allow for ratio
33. See, e.g., Slovic & Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression
Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 649 (1971).
34. L. MARKS, SENSORY PROCESSES (1974).
35. S. STEVENS, PSYCHOPHYSICS (1975).
36. Schum, supra, note 23.
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judgments of the sort we have discussed. Under this subjectivist
view, when a person tells you H is ten times more probable than
HC, given evidence E, this person probably means what he says
and is likely to give the same response again under similar circumstances. It is interesting to note that research indicates that
individuals' estimates come closer to PM calculations when they
respond in odds rather than in probabilities. 37 To reject human
ability to form ratios is to reject the results of countless experiments in which such judgments were made naturally and consistently.
Following are specific comments I have about the paradoxes
the author claims to exist when PM is applied to juridical inference.
a. Conjunction rule difficulties in civil suits. Since the law
requires plaintiff to prove each element or point Hi on the balance of probabilities, we must have PM (Hi IE) > PM (Hic IE)
if Hi- is independent of other elements; this requires PM (Hi IE)
> 0.5 as we have seen. If the elements are not independent we
may have, for example, the requirement that PM (H2 IH1 n
E) > PM (H2cl H1 n E); this means that PM (H2 IHl n E)
> 0.5. lfthe proving of each point constitutes a separate inference-problem, then there is no difficulty for PM . If, in addition,
as the author argues, plaintiff must prove his overall contention
H = (H1 n H2 r'l ... n Hn) on the balance of probabilities,
then there:-are difficulties for PM. In this case we must have
PM (H1 U H2 U ... U Hn) > PM (H1C nH2C n. nHnC).
It is a relatively easy matter to establish that, under this additional requirement~ the ·product PM (H1-rE) · .PM (H2 IH1 n
E).• .... •PM (Hn IHn-·1 -,t Hn_·.2 n ... n H2 n H1 n E)
must be greater than 0.5. If you agree with the author that both
requirements must be met, then PM produces the paradoxical
results the author claims. Some may wish to argue, however,
that the additional requirement of proof of the overall contention constitutes inferential double jeopardy. Having won each
individual contest to the satisfaction of the law, why should the
defendant now be required to show that he won all of them?
Cohen says this is closing one's eyes to facts one does not like.
b. Inference upon inference. Suppose you must prove E
from F and then prove H from E. In civil cases the author tells
37. Phillips & Edwards, Conservatism in a Simple Probability Inference
Task, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 346, 352-54 (1966).
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us that a frequent constraint is that, though H may be proved
from E on balance of probabilities, E must be proved from F
beyond reasonable doubt. The author, speaking normatively,
says this corresponds with expectation since proof should depend upon what is probably inferable from known facts rather
than what is certainly inferable from probable facts. These· are
extremes, of course; what about the commonly occurring instance in which proof must depend upon what is probably inferable from probable facts? This seems to characterize many
situations in civil and criminal trials in which inference rests
upon catenations of circumstantial events and in which information about these events comes from witnesses who are not infallible observers and who are subject to all manner of biasing
and other motivational influences.
Consider a simple inference upon inference involving testimonial evidence where the occurrence of E is to be proved from
testimony E! from witness Wi and His to be proved from E.
Under the above-mentioned constraint, though H be provable
from Eon balance of probability, E must be proved from Ei
beyond reasonable doubt. Perhaps in those instances in which
this constraint is not enforced the court has recognized something which well-posed PM formalizations make clear: an already weak linkage between--E and H cannot be much disturbed
by a less than perfect linkage between E and E nor can a
strong lin~age between E and H be preserved by a weak linkage
between Ei and E. The observed transitivity of the PM formulations simply asserts that in establishing the probative value of
testimony there can be trade-offs between the probative value
of the event being reported and the credibility of the source reporting the occurrence of this event.
c. Negation. Imagine a civil suit tried according to PM in
which plaintiff proves all points on the balance of probability
and proves the overall contention H on balance of probability.
Suppose PM (HIE} = 0.501; then, as PM requires, PM (HCjE}
= 0.499. As the author argues, defendant can feel cheated because the court apparently recognizes that there is a substantial
probability of his contention HC on the evidence presented. Now
let us try another case, this time according to P1 , in which plaintiff loses one point Hi on balance of probabilities. When plaintiff
asks what the value of PJ (Hi, E} is, he cannot believe his ears
when told that it is zero. Surely, he says, there has been suppression of uncertainty somewhere in the process. We argue that he

i.
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does not understand inductive probability. Apart from the fact
that no conception of probability is likely to make a loser any
happier, the negation principle for P1 operates with a harshness
and discontinuity which many persons will not find characteristic of their own inductive reasoning processes. However, the
author tells us that his claim is the modest one that some people
use the P1 concept, particularly in law courts. 38
d. Beyond a reasonable doubt. I freely admit to some discomfort about the nonspecific nature of this forensic standard of
proof when matters are construed in terms of the PM system.
The author's Pi system is much more specific regarding this
standard of proof but I believe there is still reason for discomfort. Within Pi, proof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof at
a level of inductive certainty; i.e., when there is no specific
reason for doubting the truth of a conclusion. Maximum Pi (H,
E) is obtained when evidence E includes all relevant points to be
established together with satisfaction that the prosecution has
proven these points. I, for one, have difficulty imagining a situation in which all relevant points have been listed, let alone
established in fact.
Consideration of witness credibility is of obvious importance
here but I find the author to be rather vague about the formal
connection between the credibility of a witness and the probative value of the testimony given by the witness. He regards the
probability that the witness is telling the truth as an inductive
probability whose value depends upon the grade of inductive
support for the prediction that the· witness will give credible
testimony, given what you know about the witness. I could not
discover how credibility-related information is combined, if at
all, with information about the probative value of the event the
witness reports in order to establish the probative value of the
testimony. In part, this is due to the fact that the author does
not distinguish between the occurrence of event E and the testimony
of this event given by a witness.
I have already spoken my piece on the "criterion" difficulties
mentioned by the author. The next difficulty on his list concerns
corroborative and converging evidence. The author's main point
here concerned his arguments against prior-posterior analyses
in establishing the weight of evidence. I have also discussed this

E.i

38. L. J. COHEN, supra note 8, at 118.
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matter above and have shown how such a prior-posterior analysis is consistent with rule 401 on relevancy.
IV.

IN CONCLUSION

I have told you that I am a defendant in the case Cohen presents against the interpretation of legal standards of proof and
of other evidentiary issues in terms of Pascalian or mathematical probability. A defendant's praise for the work of a prosecuting attorney is perhaps rare enough to be noteworthy and I do
indeed offer my praise for Cohen's w-otk. At least the length of
this review should suggest how seriously I took his arguments.
The system of inductive probability he offers does explain
certain paradoxes with which one is confronted when one tries
to apply mathematical probabilities to juridical inference. The
mathematical probability system is now very rich and some
very difficult inferential problems can find formal representation within this system. However, the author believes that the
price to be paid for this richnes~ is too high. After you read his
work you may or may not agree about the extravagance of the
price. However, this book is guaranteed to deflate the hardened
mathematicist who may perceive that mathematical probability
is the only system within which canons for coherent probabilistic inference can be found.
Not all of this book can be read easily without some background in formal logic. However, the parts of the book that concern juridical inference can, I believe, be read quite easily without this background. This book ought to be read by other persons whose research interests relate to juridical inference. The
author discusses how his system of inductive probabilities seems
to account for some of the results found by experimental psychologists when they study human behavior in probabilistic inference tasks. In summary, I found The Probable and the Provable a profound and stimulating work of scholarship, and I
close my comments with applause for its author.

